Technological unemployment : a brief history of an idea by Campa, Riccardo
This article traces a brief history of a particularly rel-
evant concept in political economy and economic so-
ciology: technological unemployment. The historical
narration aims at covering four centuries, since the
beginning of the industrial revolution up to the pres-
ent. As a consequence, it has to be highly selective. It
is mainly based on sources in the English language
and refers only to a few of the many social scientists
involved in the debate. The scopes of the inquiry are
essentially two. The first is to show that focusing on
technological unemployment as an idea – and not
simply as a phenomenon – is appropriate, because of
the high level of controversy that still characterises the
debate. The second is to drive attention to a concept
that could be extremely useful to understand the tech-
nological and societal changes occurring in the
twenty-first century. 
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1. Generalities
The concept of technological unemployment is re-
gaining momentum in the discourse of economists
and economic sociologists. However, when analysing
the debate, what is most surprising is the substantial
absence of agreement on the very existence of tech-
nological unemployment as a phenomenon. Some ob-
servers present technological unemployment as a
sprawling monster that is completely subverting the
global economy, while others conclude that this pic-
ture is just a mirage of doomsayers. Since reputable
scholars are engaged in the debate, we cannot simply
blame the polarisation of narratives on the incompe-
tence of one or the other school of thought. Even if
the definitions of technological unemployment pro-
vided by different sources do not differ particularly,
it has become evident that the terms contained in
these definitions may assume different meanings de-
pending on the theoretical perspective.
Unemployment is a phenomenon studied by both
sociologists and economists. As Tony Elger (2006:
643) remarks, “[s]ociologists often focus on the expe-
rience and consequences of unemployment, leaving
economists to analyse causes. […] However, consid-
eration of the underlying processes that generate these
patterns of unemployment exposes continuing con-
troversy among economists, for example between ne-
oliberal, neo-Keynesian, and neo-Marxist analyses of
the political economy of contemporary capitalism.
Thus, economic sociologists have to adjudicate be-
tween these different causal accounts [...].”
Unemployment is a complex phenomenon.
“Economists distinguish between frictional unem-
ployment, involving individual mobility of workers
between jobs; structural unemployment, resulting
from the decline of particular sectors or occupations;
and cyclical unemployment, resulting from general
but temporary falls in economic activity” (ibid.). To
this list, one can add technological unemployment.
The Oxford Dictionary of Economics defines 
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technological unemployment as follows: “Unemploy-
ment due to technical progress. This applies to partic-
ular types of workers whose skill is made redundant
because of changes in methods of production, usually
by substituting machines for their services. Technical
progress does not necessarily lead to a rise in overall
unemployment.” (Black 2012, 405). As one can see,
it is a concept that already includes a theory, since it
puts into causal relationship two distinct phenomena:
technological progress and unemployment. The dis-
agreement between the different schools of thought
mainly concerns the existence of this causal relation-
ship. 
Technological unemployment can be studied at
different levels of the economic system: at the level of
individual actors, companies, productive sectors,
countries, or global economy. That at least one indi-
vidual has lost his job because the employer or the cus-
tomer has purchased a machine that can accurately
perform his/her duties is a fact that can hardly be de-
nied. Similarly, it cannot be denied that entire com-
panies have been automated and this process has
resulted in a drastic reduction of employment inside
the company. As well as it cannot be denied that, owing
to technological innovation, entire economic sectors
have been largely emptied of their workforce. The
transition from traditional agriculture to intensive
agriculture, through the use of agricultural machinery,
herbicides, fertilisers, fungicides, etc., has led to de-
mographic emptying of the countryside. The evapo-
ration of jobs in the primary sector of the United
States of America offers impressive numbers: in 1900
41% of the population was employed in agriculture.
A century later, in 2000, only 2% of Americans still
worked in same sector (Wladawsky-Berger 2015). A
similar phenomenon was observed in the secondary
sector, or manufacturing, at the turn of the twentieth
and twenty-first century. In the United States, the ratio
between employment in the factories decreased from
22.5% in 1980 to 10% today and is expected further
decline to below 3% by 2030 (Carboni 2015). Similar
situations can be observed in other industrialised
countries, including Italy (Campa 2014a).
This emptying of whole sectors of the economy
was accompanied by a migration of the workforce from
one sector to another. A first migration was observed
from agriculture to manufacturing, a visible phenom-
enon because it also led to a massive migration from
rural to urban areas. A second migration of the labour
force, less visible but equally significant, occurred from
the manufacturing sector to the services sector (Campa
2007). Overall, at least so far, the increase in produc-
tivity in individual sectors has not resulted in the
emergence of a permanent and chronic technological
unemployment on a global level. This does not mean,
however, that technological unemployment – at least
as a temporary or local phenomenon – does not exist.
It should also be clear that the reabsorption of the
unemployed into the economy has been possible
thanks to two main levers: the first is free market,
which enabled the birth and development of new sec-
tors of the economy; the second is social and industrial
public policies. The fact that both forces are at work is
often obscured by the fact that observers are largely di-
vided into two tribes: those who worship the Market
as an almighty God, and those who attribute an anal-
ogous divine character to the State. Only those who
do not profess either “religion” can see that many fac-
tors have contributed to dampen the phenomenon of
technological unemployment. Private entrepreneurs
have created manufacturing industries and used the
cheap labour flowing from countryside to city, in the
nineteenth and early twentieth century. New enter-
prising capitalists have created service companies to
redeploy manpower pouring out from factories, in the
second half of the twentieth century. At the same time,
trade unions and socialist political parties, through
tough political and labour struggles, have succeeded
in achieving steady reduction of working hours (even
a halving of working hours, if we consider the period
from the nineteenth century to the present), retire-
ment and disability pensions, paid holidays, paid sick-
ness, maternity leave, and other social rights, which
on the whole have forced private employers to hire
more workers than they would have hired in a laissez-
faire capitalist regime.
Moreover, the idea that the equilibrium of a 
national economy is assured by the Invisible Hand is 
belied by the fact that employment crises have 
sometimes been resolved by the mass migration of
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workers from one country to another. This means that
it is not written in the stars that capable private entre-
preneurs and creative people who create new jobs, new
companies, or even new economic sectors must con-
tinually rise. If they do not rise, if there are no social
and cultural conditions that permit them to arise, the
unemployment crisis generated by the introduction of
new technologies can become chronic and irreversible
in a specific geographical area. Finally, other forms of
public intervention, such as industrial policies, have
contributed to cushion the phenomenon. For in-
stance, the creation of public manufactories, the na-
tionalisation of private companies, public contracts
(just think of the incidence of military spending in the
United States), wars, crime (the prison population in
the US now exceeds two million individuals), as well
as the creation of millions of jobs in the public service
– jobs that are sometimes unnecessary and therefore
constitute a permanent masked dole.
If you consider all these aspects, some of which are
ignored by economic theory, it seems difficult to deny
the existence of technological unemployment. Some-
what different is the question of whether it is a signif-
icant phenomenon on a global scale. From the
psychological point of view, being replaced by a ma-
chine is certainly a big concern for those who lose their
jobs, even temporarily. But the issue begins to acquire
political relevance only if the proportion of individuals
affected by the phenomenon is likely to disrupt an en-
tire economic system. Throughout history, different
moments when the phenomenon of technological un-
employment has assumed critical proportions were
observed. In these periods, the idea of technological
unemployment has gained major relevance in the pub-
lic debate.
2. Luddism: The First Reaction
Notoriously, a rather critical moment in European his-
tory was the transition from feudalism to capitalism,
and not only for bloody political revolutions that ac-
companied the transformation. In the so-called feudal
system, the creation of work did not constitute a prob-
lem, because social mobility was minimal. Children
inherited the job of their fathers. The children of the
farmers knew that they would be farmers themselves,
or serfs. The children of the artisans learned their pro-
fession in the workshops of their fathers. The eldest
son of an aristocratic family inherited the family es-
tate, while his younger brothers were initiated in a mil-
itary or ecclesiastical career. Daughters would be wives
of men chosen by the father, or nuns. Beggars, rob-
bers, vagabonds, prostitutes, and adventurers formed
exceptions to the strict rule. In the Middle Ages, oth-
ers were the economic concerns: wars, epidemics,
famines. A serious problem that could arise was rather
labour shortages as a result of these phenomena.
With the transition to capitalism, previously un-
known problems arise: in particular, overproduction
and unemployment. The introduction of machines in
the production system and social mobility disrupt the
traditional conception of work and life. To many, it
appears inconceivable that someone willing to work
cannot find a job. So much so that the first reaction
of the political authorities is to limit the use of the ma-
chines where cause unemployment. Even mercantilist
Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who gave great impulse to the
industrialisation of France by the creation of so-called
Manufactures nationales, passed measures to restrict
the use of machines in private companies.
Where the authorities do not intervene, the work-
ers themselves may make a fierce and desperate strug-
gle against the machine, of which we find a detailed
account in Capital by Karl Marx (1976: 554-555). 
In the seventeenth century nearly all Europe experi-
enced workers’ revolts against the ribbon-loom, a ma-
chine for weaving ribbons and lace trimmings called
in Germany Bandmühle, Schnurmühle, or Mühlen-
stuhl. In the 1630s, a wind-driven sawmill, erected
near London by a Dutchman, succumbed to the rage
of the mob. Even as late as the beginning of the eigh-
teenth century, saw-mills driven by water overcame
the opposition of the people only with great difficulty,
supported as this opposition was by Parliament. No
sooner had Everett constructed the first woolshearing
machine to be driven by water-power (1758) than it
was set on fire by 100,000 people who had been
thrown out of work. Fifty thousand workers, who had
previously lived by carding wool, petitioned Parlia-
ment against Arkwright’s scribbling mills and carding
engines. The large-scale destruction of machinery
which occurred in the English manufacturing districts
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during the first fifteen years of the nineteenth cen-
tury, largely as a result of the employment of the
power-loom; and known as the Luddite movement,
gave the anti-Jacobin government, composed of such
people as Sidmouth and Castlereagh, a pretext for the
most violent and reactionary measures. It took both
time and experience before the workers learnt to dis-
tinguish between machinery and its employment by
capital, and therefore to transfer their attacks from
the material instruments of production to the form of
society which utilizes those instruments.
David F. Noble (1995: 3-23) maintains that the
Luddites are not to be considered technophobic.
When the machinery was introduced in manufac-
tures, the workers destroyed it because of necessity,
not because of technophobia. Their choice was lim-
ited to three options: 1) starvation for them and their
families; 2) violence against the uncompassionate
owners of the means of production; 3) destruction of
the means of production. Choosing the third option
was the mildest way to communicate their discomfort
as regards unemployment.
The reaction of the political authorities was clearly
less mild. Such was the incidence of the phenomenon
that the English government implemented the death
penalty for Luddites. The ‘assassination’ of a machine
was put on a par with the assassination of a human
being.
3. Classical Political Economy: The
First Denial
In spite of the fact that the appearance of machinery
produces worrisome social disorders, economists are
reluctant to modify their theories in order to make
place for technological unemployment. There are just
a few exceptions. For instance, an attempt at concep-
tualisation is found in James Steuart’s book An Inquiry
into the Principles of Political Economy (1767), and pre-
cisely in chapter XIX (“Is the Introduction of Ma-
chines into Manufactures prejudicial to the Interest
of a State, or hurtful to Population?”). Steuart admits
that the sudden mechanisation of a segment of the
production can produce temporary unemployment
and, therefore, public policies are needed to facilitate
the absorption of the labour force into other tasks. He
is still persuaded that the advantages of mechanisation
outweigh negative side effects, but is also convinced
that problems do not solve themselves. However, that
of Steuart is an isolated voice. 
Classical economics is dominated by Adam
Smith’s optimistic perspective, which emphasises the
positive effects of mechanisation and the self-regulat-
ing nature of market economies. In his masterpiece
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations, he provides evidence of a causal connection
between high taxation and unemployment (Smith
1998: 1104), or excessive prodigality of the landlords
and unemployment (Smith 1998: 448-449), rather
than between the use of machinery and unemploy-
ment. Machinery is mainly seen as a means to increase
the productivity of labourers.
The annual produce of the land and labour of any na-
tion can be increased in its value by no other means
but by increasing either the number of its productive
labourers, or the productive powers of those labourers
who had before been employed. […] The productive
powers of the same number of labourers cannot be in-
creased, but in consequence either of some addition
and improvement to those machines and instruments
which facilitate and abridge labour; or of a more
proper division and distribution of employment.
(Smith 1998: 455-456).
When Smith takes into consideration the possibil-
ity of a connection between the mechanisation of
labour and the redundancy of labourers, he sees this
situation uniquely as a chance for capitalists and land-
lords, and not as a problem for the working class.
In consequence of better machinery, of greater dexter-
ity, and of a more proper division and distribution of
work, all of which are the natural effects of improve-
ment, a much smaller quantity of labour becomes
requisite for executing any particular piece of work,
and though, in consequence of the flourishing cir-
cumstances of the society, the real price of labour
should rise very considerably, yet the great diminu-
tion of the quantity will generally much more than
compensate the greatest rise which can happen in the
price. (Smith 1998: 338)
Afterwards, classical economists developed “the
theory that the working class is being compensated
for initial sufferings, incident to the introduction of
a labour-saving machine, by favorable ulterior effects”
(Schumpeter 2006: 652). 
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Marx baptises this theory as theory of compensation.
Among the fathers of the theory, Marx lists James
Mill, John McCulloch, Robert Torrens, Nassau W.
Senior, and John Stuart Mill. David Ricardo should
also be added to the list. In synthesis, this theory states
that, if new machines allow to save labour, manpower
will be needed for the production of said machinery.
Also, if initially the new production processes saves
labour, then they boost demand and jobs, through the
reduction of costs and, therefore, the price of the
goods offered. Finally, it is hypothesised that there is
a perfect identity between income and spending, and
therefore the theory assumes that the major revenues
arising from the reduction of the workforce in facto-
ries and farms will result in greater demand for con-
sumer goods by capitalists and landlords, which in
turn will create new jobs. 
4. The Conversion of David Ricardo
If this is so, why do laid-off workers get so angry? Ev-
idently, even admitting that there is a medium-term
or long-term compensation of losses, the short-term
effects are devastating for a social class that has no cap-
ital or assets. For those who live for the day, and per-
haps have many children to support, even a few weeks
unemployment can be lethal. If we consider that, in
order to find a new job, the proletarian must some-
times emigrate, leaving loved places and people, or ac-
cept a less satisfying and less remunerated job, while
he or she sees his or her former employer getting
richer thanks to the new machinery, his or her back-
lash appears less mysterious.
It is for this reason that the great economist David
Ricardo, in 1821, decided to bring the issue of tech-
nological unemployment into economic theory. It
must be said that, initially, Ricardo not only remained
in the wake of classical economics, denying the issue
and arguing that the introduction of machinery is
beneficial to all social classes, but had also produced
what Blaug (1958: 66) has called “the first satisfactory
statement of the theory of ‘automatic compensation’.”
Subsequently, however, disorienting his own follow-
ers, “Ricardo retracted his former opinion on the sub-
ject” (Kurz 1984). In the third edition of Ricardo’s
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, published
in 1821 – and precisely in Chapter XXXI, “On Ma-
chinery” – one can indeed find both the admission of
the conversion and a clear formulation of the idea of
technological unemployment.
Ricardo (1821: 282) states that it is more incum-
bent on him to declare his opinions on this question
“because they have, on further reflection, undergone
a considerable change.” 
Ever since I first turned my attention to questions of
political economy, I have been of the opinion that
such an application of machinery to any branch of
production, as should have the effect of saving labour,
was a general good, accompanied only with that por-
tion of inconvenience which in most cases attends the
removal of capital and labour from one employment
to another.
The English economist proceeds by summarising
the theory of compensation. Afterwards, he states that
these “were” his opinions on the matter. More pre-
cisely, Ricardo (1821: 283) states that his opinions
“continue unaltered, as far as regards the landlord and
the capitalist;” but now he is convinced “that the sub-
stitution of machinery for human labour, is often very
injurious to the interests of the class of labourers.” 
That this injury concerns both salaries and em-
ployment chances is declared a few pages later. First,
he provides examples based on numbers. Then, he
concludes as follows: 
All I wish to prove, is, that the discovery and use of
machinery may be attended with a diminution of
gross produce; and whenever that is the case, it will be
injurious to the labouring class, as some of their num-
ber will be thrown out of employment, and popula-
tion will become redundant, compared with the
funds which are to employ it. (Ricardo 1821: 286)
Historians of economics often underline the im-
portance of this step. For instance, Heinz D. Kurz
(1984) concludes that, thanks to Ricardo, the idea of  
technological unemployment “marks its first appear-
ance in respectable economic literature.” 
As we have seen, the Luddites had denounced this
problem much earlier, but not until Ricardian eco-
nomic theory did technological unemployment take
on the aura of a scientific concept. After Ricardo, 
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classical economists were obliged to refute the most
simplistic forms of compensation theory and to de-
velop more sophisticated forms of it. 
In his 1848 Principles of Political Economy, John
Stuart Mill (2009: 51) states that “[a]ll attempts to
make out that the labouring-classes as a collective
body can not suffer temporarily by the introduction
of machinery, or by the sinking of capital in perma-
nent improvements, are, I conceive, necessarily falla-
cious.” He stresses that it is “obvious to common
sense” and also “generally admitted” that workers
would suffer in the particular department of industry
to which the change applies. However, he still con-
cludes that, at least in opulent countries, the exten-
sion of machinery is not detrimental but beneficial
to labourers. In his words, “the conversion of circu-
lating capital into fixed, whether by railways, or man-
ufactories, or ships, or machinery, or canals, or mines,
or works of drainage and irrigation, is not likely, in
any rich country, to diminish the gross produce or
the amount of employment for labour” (Stuart Mill
2009: 252).
4. Karl Marx: Beyond Economic
Theory
The subtitle of Karl Marx’s Capital is A Critique of
Political Economy. As a consequence, to label “political
economy” his own scientific work would imply some
degree of intellectual violence. It is also true that no
discipline can easily describe his theoretical and em-
pirical contributions to social science. Besides being
considered a philosopher, a political thinker, an his-
torian and an economist, Marx has been also de-
scribed as a sociologist (Lefebvre 1982, Durand
1995) and, more specifically, as an economic sociologist
(Swedberg 1987: 22-24). This characterisation is par-
ticularly appropriate when talking about technologi-
cal unemployment. 
Economic sociology and political economy are
two mutually enriching disciplines, differing in a few
important respects (Smelser 1976). One of these is
the range of the analysis. The former offers a holistic
point of view, by paying attention also to cultural de-
terminants, emotional dimensions, and social conse-
quences of economic phenomena. Economists asks
themselves if there is a causal connection between
technological development and unemployment, in
the short or the long run. Economic sociologists aim
also at knowing the life conditions of workers inside
and outside the factory, that is: if they work safely or
unsafely, if they are mobbed when employed, if they
abuse alcohol or fall into depression when unem-
ployed, how and where their family live, how many
children they have, if their children go to school, if
they were forced to migrate, etc. 
When we read the chapter on “Machinery and
Large-Scale Industry” of Capital, we find much in-
formation that we can hardly find in a book of polit-
ical economy. Here is just an example:
Here we shall merely allude to the material condi-
tions under which factory labour is performed. Every
sense organ is injured by the artificially high tempera-
tures, by the dust-laden atmosphere, by the deafening
noise, not to mention the danger to life and limb
among machines which are so closely crowded to-
gether, a danger which, with the regularity of the sea-
sons, produces its list of those killed and wounded in
the industrial battle. (Marx 1976: 552)
Unlike the economist of his time, who would just
deal with laws and regulations by assuming that they
are respected and, therefore, constitute a solid basis
for predictive theories, Marx takes into account also
the possibility that laws and regulations may remain
just on paper and never affect real factory life. This is
the typical sociological point of view. For instance,
Marx (1976: 552) notes that “although it is strictly
forbidden in many, nay in most factories, that ma-
chinery should be cleaned while in motion, it is nev-
ertheless the constant practice in most, if not in all,
that the workpeople do, unreproved, pick out waste,
wipe rollers and wheels, etc., while their frames are
in motion. Thus from this cause only, 906 accidents
have occurred during the six months…”
Coming to the problem of unemployment, Marx
observes that machinery has not freed man from work
and guaranteed widespread well-being as the utopians
promised. It has rather caused the loss of any source
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of income for part of the working class and the inhu-
man exploitation of those who remained employed in
the factory. This is because, by simplifying and easing
the physical work, machinery allowed physically
stronger adult males to be replaced by women and
children. The benefit to the owners of the means of
production was threefold: less labour required; lower
cost of labour because women and children were con-
sidered lower rank workers; and indefinite time ex-
tension of work, because the natural physical fatigue
of workers was no longer an obstacle to it. The result
was the unemployment and brutishness of adult
males, who remained at home to laze around or get
drunk, while their relatives were buried alive in the
factories. 
Not without sarcasm, Marx (1976: 557) notes that
“[i]t is supposed to be a great consolation to the pau-
perized workers that, firstly, their sufferings are only
temporary (‘a temporary inconvenience’) and, sec-
ondly, machinery only gradually seizes control of the
whole of a given field of production, so that the extent
and the intensity of its destructive effect is dimin-
ished. The first consolation cancels out the second.”
No wonder then that Marx (1976: 565) praises
Ricardo for his “scientific impartiality and love of
truth.” Similarly, Lowe (1954: 142) will characterise
the chapter “On Machinery” by Ricardo as “a rare case
of self-destructive intellectual honesty.” The debate
on the scientific legitimacy of the concept, however,
did not end after Ricardo and Marx.
5. The Marginalists: Mathematics
versus Luddite Fallacy
The birth of neoclassical (or marginalist) economic
theory changes the cards on the table. In particular,
after the works of Swedish economist Knut Wicksell
the concept of technological unemployment enters a
crisis and the balance begins to lean again in favour
of compensation theory. Wicksell bases his analysis
on the law of marginal productivity of factors of pro-
duction and claims that wages are the key to the prob-
lem. According to his theory, there is no direct causal
relationship between technological progress and un-
employment, because there is another ultimate cause
of unemployment. While the expulsion of workers for
the implementation of technical innovations creates
an increase in labour supply over demand, it is also
true that in a free economy the increase in supply
leads to a decrease in wages. In turn, the reduction of
the remuneration of labour in comparison to that of
capital stimulates the demand for labour, for the sec-
tors not yet affected by technological innovation will
find it convenient to absorb the excess labour. In other
words, the unemployment rate that remains stable in
the medium or long term – the one that really worries
people and governments – is not attributable to the
increase in productivity caused by technological
progress, but eventually to the rigidity of a wage bot-
tom which prevents the reabsorption of workers in
less advanced sectors.
Compared to classical economists, the representa-
tives of the marginalist school adopt more sophisti-
cated mathematical tools, such as infinitesimal
calculus, and, thanks to the greater professionalisa-
tion, the concept of marginal utility – which is the
basis of their theory – can be accurately and formally
defined. 
Wicksell was originally a mathematician, and only
afterwards entered the field of economics. This is the
way he dealt with the problem:
If x and y are the number of labourers per acre on the
first and second methods of cultivation respectively, and
the productivity function in the one case is f(x) and in
the other ø(y); and if we assume that m acres are culti-
vated on the first method and n acres on the second,
then we must look for the conditions under which the
expression 
mf(x) + nø(y)
reaches its maximum value if, at the same time, 
m + n = B
and 
mx + ny = A
where B is the number of acres and A the number of
labourers available for the industry in question (here
agriculture) as a whole. By differentiation and elimina-
tion (the partial derivatives of the first expression being
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put = 0) we can easily obtain the two equations 
f ’(x) = ø’(y)
and
f(x) - xf ’(x) = ø(y) - yø’(y),
of which the former indicates that when the gross prod-
uct is a maximum the marginal productivity of labour,
and therefore wages, will be the same in both types of
production, The second equation gives the same con-
dition for rent per acre. 
Thus, although at first sight the going-over of some
firms to the new method of cultivation seems to dimin-
ish the total product, actually the total product is max-
imized; but at the same time wages necessarily fall, so long
as we assume that the gross product is less in the estates
cultivated by the new method than in those cultivated
by the old. (Wicksell 1977: 140)
The idea that the whole debate among theorists of
technological unemployment and theorists of auto-
matic compensation could develop only because of
the lack of professionalisation of nineteenth century
economists becomes widely accepted in academia. For
instance, Schumpeter (2006: 652) concludes that
“[t]he controversy that went on throughout the nine-
teenth century and beyond, mainly in the form of ar-
gument pro and con ‘compensation,’ is dead and
buried: as stated above, it vanished from the scene as
a better technique filtered into general use which left
nothing to disagree about.”
To be precise, the controversy was “dead and
buried” only for the economists of the neoclassical
school (Montani 1975). For non-orthodox econo-
mists, in the folds of the calculations, a bleak thesis
(to say the least) was hidden: if the Luddites attributed
the ‘fault’ of unemployment to machinery, and Marx-
ists to the capitalist system of exploitation, neoclassical
economists unloaded it on workers who were not sat-
isfied to work for a mess of pottage, or on those social
democratic governments that imposed a minimum
hourly wage so that workers could at least survive.
6. The Keynesians: Technological
Unemployment as a Fact
The hegemony of neoclassical economics in academia
seemed to be unassailable, when a game changer en-
ters the spotlight: the devastating economic crisis of
1929. A new paradigm, the Keynesian, becomes des-
tined to take stake in political and scientific circles.
Challenging the orthodoxy, in a 1930 article pub-
lished in The Nation, John Maynard Keynes reintro-
duces the concept of technological unemployment in
the economic discourse. Quite curiously, he speaks
about it as a new disease, as if Ricardo and Marx had
never discussed the issue before. These are his words:
We are being afflicted with a new disease of which
some readers may not yet have heard the name, but of
which they will hear a great deal in the years to come
– namely, technological unemployment. This means un-
employment due to our discovery of means of
economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at
which we can find new uses for labour. But this is
only a temporary phase of maladjustment. All this
means in the long run that mankind is solving its eco-
nomic problem. (Keynes 1963, 325)
Keynes is not a pessimist, nor a Luddite. He sees
in technological progress a great resource for human-
ity. He is convinced that technological unemployment
is only a temporary illness. This is because he is con-
fident in the possibility of solving the problem with
appropriate public policies, starting with a drastic re-
duction of working hours. In the same article, the
English economist forecasts that “in the course of our
life” (that is, in the space of a few decades), we will
see ongoing social reforms that will lead us to work
three hours a day, five days a week, for a total of fifteen
hours per week, at equal income conditions. In short,
it seemed reasonable to solve the economic crisis by
implementing a simple formula: working less, work
for all. That is, by evenly redistributing the benefits
of technological progress.
During the Great Depression, other outstanding
scholars focus on the problem of technological unem-
ployment. In August 1930s, Paul H. Douglas 
publishes an article entitled “Technological Unem-
ployment” in the American Federationist, but only 
to say that the introduction of labour-saving 
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improvements cannot cause permanent unemploy-
ment. He maintains that we should rather expect an
“automatic” absorption into employment of fired
workers, because the demand of employers and those
workers still employed is destined to grow as a result
of the reduction of costs per unit of output due to
technological improvement. 
One year later, Alvin Hansen responds to Douglas
with an article entitled “Institutional Frictions and
Technological Unemployment”, appearing in The
Quarterly Journal of Economics (1931). Here, Hansen
accuses Douglas of reviving the old doctrine of J. B.
Say, James Mill, and David Ricardo (meaning the first
and second editions of the Principia), and in particu-
lar the grave fallacy of compensation theory. 
Quite significantly, Hansen was still not “the
American Keynes” in the moment when he published
this article. He still defended the orthodox theory in
1937, when he occupied the chair of Political Econ-
omy at Harvard University. His conversion to Keyne-
sianism happened later, but here we can see that there
was already a convergence on the issue of technolog-
ical unemployment.
The 1930s polemics does not end here. Gottfried
Haberler (1932: 558) immediately takes the defense
of Professor Douglas, “for it would be deplorable if
an ungrounded hostility and suspicion against tech-
nological progress should be aroused or intensified.”
That ‘temporary’ technological unemployment ex-
ists seems not in doubt even among defenders of the
orthodox theory. The question is if ‘permanent’ tech-
nological unemployment does exist. Ten years later,
Hans P. Neisser upgrades technological unemploy-
ment from concept to theory. Indeed, these two words
express a causal relation, and therefore a law. More
precisely, Neisser (1942: 50) laments that “the theory
of technological unemployment is a stepchild of eco-
nomic science.” We read the following lines and we
understand that, for this scholar, there is perfect ad-
herence between this neglected theory and ‘facts’. Per-
manent technological unemployment is not only a
useful theoretical concept. It is a real phenomenon.
Thirteen years after the 1929 crisis, in spite of com-
pensation theory, there are still masses of involuntary
unemployed workers: “The facts seem to stand in
such blatant contradiction to orthodox doctrine, ac-
cording to which no ‘permanent’ technological un-
employment is possible, that most American
textbooks prefer not to mention the problem itself ”
(ibid.).
What is more important is that this “silence” is un-
precedented. Neisser reminds the readers also that
“[t]he analysis to which Ricardo subjected the dis-
placement of labour by the machine in the last edition
of the Principles had stimulated a lively discussion
among the later classical economists…” (ibid.). The
discussion died down because of the rise of neoclassi-
cal equilibrium analysis. However, Neisser correctly
underlines that this “silence” concerns only “Anglo-
Saxon literature.” 
Everett Hagen (1942: 553) also remarks that only
“[t]wo papers in American economic journals of the
past eleven years have address themselves exclusively
to the correction of errors in the prevailing analysis of
technological unemployment.” He means that written
by Hansen in 1931 and that published by Neisser in
1942. He recognises that Naisser makes a “definite
contribution,” but he also reproaches him for having
completely ignored Hansen and for having written an
article in the “post-Keynesian period” that fails “to
apply to the problem at hand the theory of saving and
investment as determinants of employment.” Hagen
gives himself the task of filling the hole.
Indeed, the debate is much richer than it seems.
First of all, it takes place also in books and not only
in articles published in economic journals. An exam-
ple is the book Value and Capital by John R. Hicks.
The first edition appears in 1939. The second edition
is published in 1946 and, afterwards, is reprinted
many times. Here the term “technological unemploy-
ment” appears only at page 291, but the concept to
which the term refers is discussed also in other parts
of the book. The author stresses the fact that technol-
ogy may produce unemployment only in specific sit-
uations, for instance, “that in which the new
equipment, which has been produced, is ‘labour-sav-
ing’; in this case there is a fall in the demand for
labour, as a result of the whole process, relatively to
the situation which would have arisen if no capital
had been accumulated at all.” In other words, “there
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is not necessarily a fall in the demand for labour at
all; there will be if early inputs and late inputs of
labour are substitutes, but not if they are complemen-
tary.” (Hicks 1946: 291)
Another book assessing the problem very seriously
is The Path of Economic Growth, published in 1976
by German economist and sociologist Adolph Lowe.
Here the term “technological unemployment” appears
many times throughout the book. Besides, being also
a sociologist, Lowe is capable of keeping a distance
from main economic schools (neo-classical, neo-
Marxian, Keynesian) in order to assess the controversy
from a different point of view.
By centering our investigation of the traverse on the
compensation of technological unemployment, we
emphasise an issue the relevance of which is highly
controversial. It has been debated for more than 150
years and, considering the secular employment trend
over this period, it is not surprising that, in the view
of the majority of experts, technological unemploy-
ment is today regarded as perhaps an occasional irri-
tant but not as an ever-present threat to the stability
of the system. Moreover, in the heat of polemics, the
arguments on either side have occasionally been over-
stated. What is still worse, the basic question at issue
has been blurred. This question is neither whether, as
a rule, nonneutral innovations initially create unem-
ployment (they do) nor whether, given sufficient
time, compensation is possible (it certainly is). The
question is whether a free market is endowed with a
systematic mechanism that assures compensation within
the Marshallian short period, thus precluding any sec-
ondary distortions that could upset dynamic equilib-
rium. (Lowe 1976: 250)
The literature on the topic appears much richer
also if we take into account books and articles written
in different languages. For instance, though being a
technological optimist, French economist Jean
Fourastié wrote much sur le risque de chômage tech-
nologique de masse (1949, 1954). Given the parame-
ters of this work, however, we decided to limit our
analysis to a few contributions in the English lan-
guage. More details about the debate on technological
unemployment in the Anglo-Saxon culture, with par-
ticular attention to the interwar period, can be found
in the works by Gregory R. Woirol (1996, 2006).
To put it briefly, while marginalist economists
keep denying the problem of technological unem-
ployment, Keynesians are sure that the problem exists,
but they are also confident that it can be solved with
opportune public policies.
7. Reaganomics: The New Denial
After the Great Depression – which ended many years
later thanks to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal
(according to the Keynesians) or to the Second World
War (according to the Austrian School) – it seemed
impossible that humankind could return to laissez-
faire capitalism. Nonetheless, the return of the neolib-
eral paradigm was successful, a few decades later, with
the landing of Margaret Thatcher to Downing Street
in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the White House in
1981. 
What happened next to their policies was not, of
course, the end of work, that is the permanent global
unemployment of the masses. In spite of the fact that
amazing innovations – innovations that in the 1930s
belonged only to the sphere of science fiction – have
been introduced in the productive system, there are
still jobs around. However, it must be adequately
stressed that the danger of chronic unemployment has
been averted only thanks to the flexibility of salaries
and job market, in full accordance with the theory of
marginal analysis.
To give just an example of the new attitude toward
automation and unemployment, I will quote some
fragments from the article “Does More Technology
Create Unemployment?” by R. H. Mabry and A. D.
Sharplin, which appeared in 1986. This is the incipit:
Each new generation brings the reemergence of many
of the fears of the past, requiring the repetition of old
explanations to put them to rest. Today there is a re-
newed concern that technological advancement may
displace much of the manufacturing (and other) work
force, creating widespread unemployment, social dis-
ruption, and human hardship. For example, in 1983
the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research fore-
cast the existence of 50,000 to 100,000 industrial ro-
bots in the United States by 1990, resulting in a net
loss of some 100,000 jobs. (Mabry and Sharplin
1986)
The authors intend to refute “all these claims and
predictions and the rhetoric that surrounds them.”
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They call rhetoric the discourse strategy of the Key-
nesians, but in fact their textual approach to the prob-
lem also presents the typical rhetoric of scientific
discourse. For instance, they try to present themselves
as equidistant from both conservatives and progres-
sives – and therefore somewhat neutral or purely sci-
entific. Indeed, they explicitly distance themselves
from “conservative economic thinkers”, who “tend to
disparage persons who fear the rapid advance of tech-
nology by labeling them ‘Luddites’.” This is said to
be a term “both unfair and inaccurate.” However, a
few lines below, they seem to justify the characteriza-
tion of progressives as Luddites. They state that at
least “[i]n part, opposition to technology springs sim-
ply from a more or less visceral fear of scientism,
which is often taken to imply the dehumanisation of
humankind.” 
Again, they try to regain a fair position in the de-
bate by recognizing that “the warnings heard today
are thoughtful and well intentioned”, but, in the same
sentence, they immediately underline that the theo-
rists of technological unemployment are “often in
error or somewhat self-serving.” This narrative implies
that the deniers of technological unemployment are
not self-serving. After a few sentences aimed at show-
ing a more balanced attitude toward the problem,
Mabry and Sharplin simply restate the standard posi-
tion of orthodox political economy:
Flatly in error are those that predict no more jobs for
a very large sector of the population because of ad-
vancing technology, creating a massive problem of in-
voluntary unemployment. It is not at all clear that a
large number of jobs are about to be destroyed; even
if they were, such long-run unemployment as would
occur would certainly not be involuntary. Rather, it
would take the form of even shorter workdays,
shorter work-weeks, and fewer working members in
the family, as it has throughout our history. Some
who correctly anticipate that technological change
may produce short-run employment-adjustment
problems overstate those problems. They also often
fail to mention that the short-run unemployment
that occurs is primarily the result of artificial imper-
fections — a lack of competition — in certain labour
and product markets.
Briefly, according to the authors, there is not long-
run involuntary unemployment, while short-run un-
employment is not caused by technological advance-
ment but by public policies. In a regime of laissez-
faire capitalism, people would immediately find new
jobs and enjoy technological advances by working less
and earning more.
8. Artificial Intelligence: The Specter
of a Jobless Society
Has this 1980s prophecy been fulfilled in the follow-
ing decades? By the end of the twentieth century, a
legion of social scientists answers negatively to the
question. The spectre of a jobless society reappears in
books such as The End of Work by Jeremy Rifkin
(1995), Progress without People by David F. Noble
(1995), and Turning Point by Robert U. Ayres (1998).
The alarm takes a larger magnitude if we consider also
the publications in other languages. For instance, Ital-
ian sociologist Luciano Gallino has written much, in
his own mother tongue, about technological unem-
ployment (1998, 2007).
The narrative of this wave of social criticism can
be summarised as follows: the introduction of com-
puters and robots in factories and offices, in the last
forty years, has led to the enrichment of a minority
and the insecurity and impoverishment of the major-
ity. There are still jobs on the market, because ma-
chines, at their present stage of development, cannot
completely replace labour. They can only complement
it. Jobs that do not disappear completely are those in-
volving a physical effort that cannot be defined by a
tractable list of rules and, therefore, cannot be easily
implemented in a machine, or those that are so hum-
ble and low paid that, even when their automation is
technically possible, it is still more economical to hire
humans. However, it is just a matter of time. In the
near future, machines will be able to replace humans
in any activity. Therefore, a profound reform of our
society is needed and urgently.
Social scientists with this viewpoint have occasion-
ally attracted the accusation of ‘intellectual Luddism.’
A similar accusation could not, however, be raised
against a second wave of social criticism arising a few
years later, given that its exponents are mainly 
engineers and computer scientists. An explosion of
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publications on Artificial Intelligence, seen as the
demiurge of a jobless society, takes place after the
2008 financial crises. Authors like Martin Ford (2009,
2015), Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee (2012,
2016), Stan Neilson (2011), Jerry Kaplan (2015), just
to mention a few, are deeply convinced that technol-
ogy is a “good thing,” but it cannot but render human
beings obsolete. Therefore, the only way to avoid an
epochal catastrophe is to redesign our societies, start-
ing from the basements, in order to make place for
both humans and machines.
These authors tend to underline that our own is
an epoch of painful transition, but a “golden age” of
humankind is visible at the horizon. We just need to
realise that technology is not just a tool of this or that
politico-economic system, but rather the actual pri-
mum movens of human history. A primum movens
which requires its own politico-economic system to
work at its best. The introduction of a basic income
guarantee (BIG) – that is, an income to be assigned
unconditionally to all citizens of industrial countries –
is among the various proposed solutions (Hughes
2014, Campa 2014b).
The idea of a radical societal change, which has
been buried for a few decades in the cemetery of dead
ideas, could resuscitate thanks to the crisis of neolib-
eralism following the 2008 global financial bank-
ruptcy. A crisis that, in the words of sociologist
Luciano Pellicani (2015: 397), “has demonstrated the
technical – as well as moral – absurdity of the neolib-
eral paradigm, centered on the idea of self-regulated
market.” With the addition that the markets are self-
regulating only for the lower classes, given that
bankers and capitalists can systematically count on
bailouts and public money when something goes
wrong.
Among the signs that what Ludwik Fleck called
Denkkollektiv is changing, we can mention the Nobel
Prize for economics assigned in 2008 to Keynesian
economist Paul Krugman, who afterwards has also ex-
pressed his worries about technological unemploy-
ment (2013). Or, perhaps, the planetary success of a
book like Capital in the 21st Century by Thomas
Piketty (2013).
All the optimism of the 1980s has vanished. Ac-
cording to the above-mentioned analysts, the present
transition phase is characterised by involuntary un-
employment due to automation and precarious jobs
due to flexibility policies. True, many jobs have not
yet been automatised. In the tertiary sector, we ob-
serve a proliferation of caregivers assisting elderly and
disabled at home, bellhops, call center operators, wait-
ers, fast foods workers, pizza deliverers, employees of
cleaning companies, atypical taxi drivers, external col-
laborators with VAT registration, refuse collectors,
private mail carriers, storekeepers, shop assistants, etc.
In many cases, employers still find it more cost effec-
tive to hire uneducated workers or desperate immi-
grants than mechanizing these jobs (assuming that a
machine is available or can be designed to do it).
However, what is clear is that all-life and full-time
jobs – such as jobs in large factories and public offices
– which used to be the prerogative of middle class
workers, have significantly shrunk in number as in the
level of remuneration. Observers seem to be amazed
at this phenomenon, as illustrated by a recent article
published in The Wall Street Journal:
The typical man with a full-time job–the one at the
statistical middle of the middle–earned $50,383 last
year, the Census Bureau reported this week. The typi-
cal man with a full-time job in 1973 earned $53,294,
measured in 2014 dollars to adjust for inflation. You
read that right: The median male worker who was
employed year-round and full time earned less in
2014 than a similarly situated worker earned four
decades ago. And those are the ones who had jobs.
(Wessel 2015)
This is what we read in “the bible of capitalism,”
not in a blog of angry radicals. However, it is not sur-
prising that today workers earn on average less than
their fathers or grandfathers, despite all the progress
made by humanity in the meantime, if we keep in
mind that the theory of compensation does not say
that thanks to technological progress we will all live
happily ever after. The theory says that there will be
no mass unemployment, if the governments guaran-
tee wage flexibility. The negative side effect of this pol-
icy becomes what we might call “technological
impoverishment.”
Moreover, the automation of the tertiary sector is
also relentlessly taking place. We already hear of pizza
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delivery by means of drones, of autonomous vehicles
on the roads, of chirurgical interventions made by ro-
bots, etc. Occasional households have been replaced
by cleaning robots in many homes, software substitute
for lawyers (Pasquale & Cashwell 2015), the roboti-
zation of the military is in a very advanced phase
(Campa 2015), and the automation of social work has
also started (Campa 2016). So, it is not surprising that
specialist economic literature is now taking seriously
the issue of technological unemployment (Feldmann
2013, Feng & Graetz 2015).
This does not mean that compensation theory has
disappeared from public discourse, but even those an-
alysts still moving in the wake of orthodox economics
do not dismiss the hypothesis of mass technological
unemployment when talking about the future. For in-
stance, in May 2013, the McKinsey Global Institute
published a detailed study of a dozen new technolo-
gies defined ‘disruptive’ for their potential impact on
the economy. The report is generally optimistic, be-
cause it focuses on the chances offered by technolog-
ical advances to big corporations. However, it also
recognizes that “productivity without the innovation
that leads to the creation of higher value-added jobs
results in unemployment and economic problems,
and some new technologies such as the automation
of knowledge work could significantly raise the bar
on the skills that workers will need to bring to bear
in order to be competitive” (Manyika 2013: 151). In
a 164-page report, the word “unemployment” appears
only once, but at least there is no denial of the prob-
lem.
The report assumes that policy makers can limit
the negative side effects of advanced robotics and au-
tomated knowledge work by improving and renewing
education. In other words, they “should consider the
potential consequences of increasing divergence be-
tween the fates of highly skilled workers and those
with fewer skills,” and keep in mind that “[t]he exist-
ing problem of creating a labour force that fits the de-
mands of a high-tech economy will only grow with
time” (ibid.).
This is the old recipe of neoliberalism: one does
not need the redistribution of wealth to cope with un-
employment and impoverishment; one just needs bet-
ter educated citizens and workers. If in the short term
workers may experience problems, in the long term
innovation will result in the creation of new higher
value jobs. The report maintains that also workers will
take advantage of automation. Nonetheless, it is easy
to demonstrate that these “potential benefits” could
be turned into “potential threats” by simply expressing
them with different words. Let us give an example.
On page 7, we read what follows:
It is now possible to create cars, trucks, aircraft, and
boats that are completely or partly autonomous.
From drone aircraft on the battlefield to Google’s self-
driving car, the technologies of machine vision, artifi-
cial intelligence, sensors, and actuators that make
these machines possible is rapidly improving. Over
the coming decade, low-cost, commercially available
drones and submersibles could be used for a range of
applications. Autonomous cars and trucks could en-
able a revolution in ground transportation—regula-
tions and public acceptance permitting. Short of that,
there is also substantial value in systems that assist
drivers in steering, braking, and collision avoidance.
The potential benefits of autonomous cars and trucks
include increased safety, reduced CO2 emissions,
more leisure or work time for motorists (with hands-
off driving), and increased productivity in the truck-
ing industry. (Manyika 2013: 7)
As you can see, McKinsey analysts predict a re-
markable productivity growth and, among benefits,
more free time or working hours for motorists, due to
lower mental and physical fatigue. By using a most
brutal language, we may say that the “benefits” for
workers will be more unemployment or exploitation.
9. Conclusions
This debate seems to teach us that, in a laissez faire
capitalist economy, the choice boils down to two per-
spectives: 1) if one introduces policies to safeguard the
standard of living of workers by establishing that the
minimum wage cannot fall below a certain threshold
(moderate left policy), the system produces “techno-
logical unemployment;” 2) if it is established that the
government must not interfere in negotiations be-
tween capitalists and workers, letting the market de-
cide wage levels (moderate right policy), the system
produces “technological impoverishment.” All this
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happens when an impressive technological develop-
ment may potentially improve the life condition of
everybody. Thus, contemporary society seems to be
inherently characterised by a ‘technological paradox.’
Traditional political forces converge on the idea
that improving education could be the ‘weapon’ to
contrast technological unemployment. However, not
much attention is paid to the fact that Artificial In-
telligence develops exponentially and not only prom-
ises to further reduce the workforce in manufacturing,
but it will begin to erode the work of specialists in the
service sector. In the near future, unemployment
could concern economic actors who have attended
higher education institutions and invested much time
and money to acquire their professional skills, such as
journalists, physicians, teachers, lawyers, consultants,
managers, etc.
Typically, those who bring attention to the ‘tech-
nological paradox’ characterizing our society are im-
mediately halted with a rather trivial argument: the
historically known alternative systems to capitalism –
namely: feudalism, fascism, and communism – have
failed. But this is stating the obvious. To displace this
rhetorical argument, the paradox can be better ex-
pressed by the following question: How can it be that
sentient beings capable of inventing quantum com-
puters and creating artificial life fail to come up with
a new system of production and consumption in which
these and other innovations, if they cannot be bene-
ficial to all individuals at the same extent, at least are
not detrimental to the majority?
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